unexploded cluster submunitions may be
on the ground.10 That, however, has not
stopped many Lebanese from returning to
their homes.
As soon as the ceasefire went into effect
on August 14, slightly more than half of
the 900,000 displaced Lebanese residents
packed up their belongings and headed
home to find access to both their houses
and farming fields blocked by UXO, most
frequently by bomblets scattered by cluster bombs.11 According to Andy Gleeson,
Program Manager in Lebanon for Mines
Advisory Group, residents moved back to
their villages for two reasons:
1. They wanted to assess the damage and
protect what remained of their property, so they lived in their front yard
if required (tents were supplied).
2. Hezbollah handed out US$15,000
per lost house to pay for 12 months’
rent, after which the government paid
US$35,000 per lost house.
“If you are not home, you miss out [on
the payments],” said Gleeson.12
Children in Danger
As of October 8, 2006, 770 clusterbomb-strike locations had been identified in
the south,10 and according to Gleeson, there
were 320 affected communities with each
community having around 300 to 350 items
of UXO recorded, although less in some
areas and more in other areas.12 As of
October 15, 2006, there were 20 reported
fatalities and 120 reported injuries from all
types of unexploded ordnance in Lebanon.
Children accounted for four of the fatalities and 42 of the injuries, according to
Lebanon’s National Demining Office.10
As families return home, UXO has posed
a major problem to children, who sometimes mistake unexploded bomblets for
toys. The United Nations Mine Action
Service and the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees have partnered
to provide mine-awareness training for
children from villages near Tyre, where they
have encountered cluster bomblets on a
daily basis. They were shown photos of
the kinds of UXO scattered around
Lebanon. “This training is crucial, especially for children who are innocent, who
want to play and are totally unaware that
small little items can be so harmful,” says
Dalya Farran, UNMACC–SL’s Media and
Clearance Officer.9
In addition to the dangers of UXO, upon
return, children have faced the threat of disease from lack of water, and the release of
chemicals and dust, which have badly polluted the air, causing serious health issues.
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Who is Helping?
Since the conflict ended, the main goal
of the United Nations and other international organizations is to work towards
making southern Lebanon clear of cluster
submunitions and to provide humanitarian
assistance in reconstruction and recovery.
UNMACC–SL and the National Demining
Office are coordinating clearance efforts8
which have so far resulted in 45,000 cluster bomblets being cleared and destroyed.
Clearance, explosive ordnance disposal and
information-gathering are being carried out
in part by the Lebanese Army, the United
Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, Mines
Advisory Group, BACTEC and the Swedish
Rescue Services Agency.8 Lebanon is also
now food-secure and its commercial sector
has rebounded sooner than expected.13
World Food Programme. WFP has
reached more than 700,000 people since it
started its emergency operation in July, targeting approximately 350,000 of the most
affected people in Lebanon, the majority of
them in southern Lebanon.13 In all, WFP
has distributed more than 7,250 metric
tons (7,991 U.S. tons) of food (an estimated
480,000 monthly rations) and helped the
government of Lebanon import 12,300 metric tons (13,558 U.S. tons) of wheat during
the blockade period.13 The WFP also assisted the United Nations in transporting relief
supplies such as fuel, shelter materials, water,
and hygiene and medical equipment.13
UNHCR/UNMAS. The partnership between the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees and the United Nations Mine
Action Service has focused primarily on helping the residents return to a safe environment.
It has provided tents, blankets, mattresses,
plastic sheeting and cooking kits to the
most heavily damaged villages.10 Since the
end of the conflict, UNHCR supported
UNMACC–SL with warehousing facilities
and five 4x4 trucks for rapid deployment
of the mine-action teams in Lebanon.10
UNHCR has also been working with the
Lebanese government to find the best ways
to repair houses.14
UNICEF. UNICEF has supported the
National Demining Office’s Mine Risk
Education Steering Committee to implement a campaign on radio and television
and in print media to increase civilian
awareness—especially in children—about
the dangers of UXO. UNICEF distributed 100,000 leaflets at army checkpoints
as well.10 UNICEF has also provided over
300,800 liters (79,463 gallons) of bottled
water to communities in southern Lebanon,
385 water kits containing collapsible containers, and purification tablets, vaccination

against measles to 16,500 children, vaccination against polio to more than 9,000, and
vitamin-A capsules for more than 9,000.15
UNIFIL. The U.N. Interim Force in
Lebanon has provided efforts to counter the
shortage of clean water in the south with the
Indian and Ghanaian battalions distributing 100,000 liters (26,417 gallons) to the
villages of El Khiam, At Tayyabah, Kfar
Kila, Tibnin and Haddathah.16 UNIFIL has
also treated people in need of medical care,
and the Indian battalion provided veterinary assistance to many animals.16 UNIFIL
is working to clear unexploded ordnance,
mainly cluster bomblets, and a demining
team from its Chinese contingent disposed
of over 1,260 pieces in one week.16
The Future
An estimated 12 to 15 months will be
needed to clear the cluster bomblets from
southern Lebanon,10 but it will take considerably longer for the residents of Lebanon to
return to their normal lives. Despite the difficult circumstances in Lebanon, the United
Nations and other international organizations working alongside the government of
Lebanon are striving to clear the unexploded
cluster munitions and provide the humanitarian assistance the Lebanese need.
Jan Egeland, Undersecretary-General
for Humanitarian Affairs, says, “The civilian population[s] in Lebanon and in northern Israel have been the biggest losers in
this senseless cycle of violence. ... Civilians
were supposed to be spared and in this conflict; they [were] not.”17
For additional information on the use of
cluster munitions in the recent Israel/Hezbollah
conflict, see the MAIC fact sheet on page 113.
See Endnotes, page 110

Cluster munitions can be dropped from the air as seen here being
dropped from a B-1B Lancer, or launched from the ground as were
most of the cluster munitions used in the 2006 conflict between
Hezbollah and Israel.

Cluster Munitions and
ERW in Lebanon
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The recent 34-day conflict between the Lebanese armed faction Hezbollah and Israel from
July 12 to August 14, 2006, saw extensive use of surface-launched munitions and air-dropped
munitions (to a lesser degree), resulting in wartime casualties for military and civilian actors in
both Lebanon and Israel. Since the ceasefire agreement, international post-conflict attention
has become focused on Lebanon due to the large number of explosive remnants of war left
behind after the conflict. In particular, cluster munitions are proving problematic for post-conflict
reconstruction activities in Lebanon due to their apparent high failure rate1 and the potential
threat they pose to returning civilians, aid workers and military personnel. This article examines
cluster munitions and the impact of their presence in Lebanon.
by Daniele Ressler and Elizabeth Wise [ Mine Action Information Center ]

E

Katie FitzGerald has worked as an
Editorial Assistant for the Journal of
Mine Action since January 2006. She
is in her last year at James Madison
University where she is pursuing her
Bachelor of Arts in print journalism.

Katie FitzGerald
Editorial Assistant
Journal of Mine Action
Mine Action Information Center
E-mail: maic@jmu.edu

arly cluster munitions were used in World War II
and were later deployed extensively by U.S. forces
in Southeast Asia during the American/Vietnam
War. Millions of tons of cluster submunitions were
dropped on Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam—90 million
on Laos alone.2 Cluster munitions were further used extensively during the Gulf War of 1991 (by the United
States and allies), in Kosovo and Yugoslavia in 1999
(United States, United Kingdom and Netherlands),
Afghanistan in 2001–2002 (United States) and Iraq in
2003 (United States and United Kingdom).
A cluster weapon consists of a munitions container
deployed by a weapon-delivery system such as a bomb
dropped by aircraft, rocket launcher or artillery projectile, which then releases smaller munitions in mid-air
that are spread over a particular area. These smaller
munitions, or submunitions, are designed to explode on

impact or close to the time of impact. Typically the delivery systems are designed
to carry and deploy hundreds of submunitions at a time. Submunitions are also
called bomblets, bombies, BLUs (bomb live units) or grenades.
Cluster munitions can be delivered by air or surface. Air-dropped cluster dispensers (or cluster bomb units) are released or fired from airplanes, and after a
specified amount of time or distance, the dispenser opens to allow submunitions
to effectively cover a wide target area. With the exception of sensor-fuzed weapons, CBUs all fall into the “dumb bomb” or unguided category, meaning once
released, their trajectory cannot be controlled or re-directed.3 Surface-launched
munitions are delivered by artillery launchers on the ground that are fired over a
long range to detonate either in the air or on impact. In the case of cluster munitions, each dispenser (e.g., missile, rocket, projectile) carries a payload of submunitions that is released after the dispenser is in flight, to drop over the target area.
During a conflict, cluster weapons are used by the military for attacking an area
where the target may be moving, such as a military convoy, either to attack and
destroy the enemy by dropping explosive bomblets (impact) or to prevent or slow
enemy movement from or to an area by dropping devices that essentially function

10.2 | winter 2006 | journal of mine action | focus | 35

as landmines (area denial).3 It is important
to note that submunitions are different and
not all are explosive or harmful in the way
that it is popularly understood; for example,
area-denial submunitions do not explode
but are victim-activated and classified as
landmines.4 For the purpose of this article,
the submunitions discussed are understood
to be those meant to explode on impact.
The area a single cluster munition can
cover with submunitions is known as a footprint, and depending on the delivery system
and type of weapon, one cluster munition
salvo may strike an area as large as one
square kilometer (247 acres).1 Cluster munitions are useful to a military because the size
of the cluster-munition footprint is much
larger than that of a single bomb.
Because there are many kinds of cluster
munitions and bomblets with different abilities and uses, a convoluted understanding
of these weapons can occur. For example,
an MLRS rocket salvo is capable of releasing thousands of submunitions over an area
within a one-kilometer (0.6-mile) radius,5
but most other strikes have fewer submunitions and a far smaller area of impact.4
Upon impact, deadly shrapnel from each
submunition can be projected over a radius
of up to 50 meters (55 yards) from the largest bomblets dropped by air;1 however, most
of the submunitions found in Lebanon and
discussed in this article have a fragmentation radius of less than 10 meters (33 feet).
While in no way intending to undermine the potential threat of cluster munitions both during and after conflict, it is
important to examine cluster munitions and
their submunitions individually rather than
grouping them together and making generalized assumptions. This is particularly
true as international attention has recently
focused on cluster munitions and is discussing their potential regulation or prohibition
based on the potential threat submunitions
may pose to militaries and civilians during
and after use.
Controversy about Cluster Munitions
The dud rate for cluster submunitions
varies dramatically; reported failure rates
can typically range anywhere from under
2 percent to over 30 percent.6 The potentially high failure rate of some cluster submunitions is one reason they are controversial.
The range in failure rate is extreme in part
because different types of cluster munitions
and their parts vary greatly, particularly the
fuzes, resulting in varying levels of successful design. In fact, not all cluster munitions
have an unacceptably high failure rate; for
example, while faulty fuzes can be a reason
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munitions fail to explode, some fuzes are extremely reliable in their design.7
Even testing and reporting failure rates
is problematic because there may be a difference between the failure rate in ideal
testing conditions and combat conditions.8
In official testing, submunitions may be
dropped on hard surfaces without obstructions such as vegetation, leading to lower
failure-rate statistics than are reflected in
real conditions.8, 9
Since conditions in the field are not necessarily the same as those during testing, in
some cases cluster submunitions may have
significantly higher failure rates during use.
Failure-rate statistics based on field use,
however, typically can only be derived from
anecdotal or incomplete records taken during the conflict and are therefore harder to
rigorously document and prove.9, 10 Thus,
failure rates quoted for cluster submunitions
may be underestimated if based on an ideal
testing environment and may be unreliable
or over-estimated if based on spotty inconflict data.
Reasons for a high failure rate vary and
can depend on the age of the submunition;
storage conditions; production (design,
construction, quality of fuzes); deployment
(arming and delivery technique, altitude of
delivery); or landing (angle of impact; softness and slope of terrain; vegetation such as
trees or bushes, marshes, snow or water, and
extreme heat or cold).6, 9
Cluster munitions are often delivered as
“unguided bombs,” meaning that they can
be aimed, but once fired, there is no controlling exactly where they land. This results in
a higher probability that they may miss the
intended military target and hit civilian areas. Factors such as weapon design, altitude
at which the dispenser is dropped or opens,
wind, dispenser spin rate and the slope of the
ground can all affect the size and location
of a cluster bomb’s footprint, contributing to
potentially inaccurate dispersal, unpredictable results and undocumented locations of
subsequent unexploded submunitions.10
With these concerns in mind, Human
Rights Watch has been developing a list
of the “worst offender” cluster munition
weapons it considers to be particularly inaccurate and unreliable. In 2003 (during the
Iraq war), HRW called on the United States
and other countries to halt the production,
use and sale of four such munitions: the
CBU-99/CBU-100 containing Rockeyes;
the CBU-87/B with the BLU 97 Combined
Effects Munition; 155-mm Dual Purpose
Improved Conventional Munition artillery projectiles with M42 and M46 submunitions; and Multiple Launch Rocket

Systems with M26 warheads (containing
M77 bomblets).11 Recently HRW expanded its list, which now totals 12—a “dirty
dozen”—cluster munitions.12
Recent Cluster-munition Use
in Lebanon
Before the recent conflict in Lebanon involving Hezbollah, Israel used cluster munitions in its 1978 and 1982 incursions into
Lebanon.13 The two-decade-old unexploded
submunitions from Israeli campaigns have
continued killing and injuring civilians,
with over 200 civilian casualties recorded
between 2000 and 2005. To be fair, it must
be understood these casualties include both

Various types of ordnance that the United Nations
has collected in southern Lebanon in its efforts to
clear the region of landmines, unexploded missiles
and cluster bombs. Unexploded cluster submunitions are reportedly being found in high numbers in
southern Lebanon, indicating a high failure rate of
some of these munitions when used during the 2006
conflict (see story on page 38).
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landmines and UXO; however, after these
(and other) conflicts, clearance teams have
found at least six confirmed types of unexploded cluster submunitions contributing to
Lebanese civilian casualties.14
It is for this reason that Human Rights
Watch and others expressed concern when
it was reported that Israel was using cluster
munitions in Lebanon in the recent conflict: first reportedly on July 19, 2006, in the
town of Blida15 and then in numerous strikes
across the country with accelerated use during the last 72 hours of the conflict.16 The
United Nations estimates the Israeli Defense
Forces fired up to 6,000 bombs, rockets and
artillery a day into Lebanon.17
Now several months after the ceasefire,
the United Nations and clearance groups
are continuing to collect data to understand
the implications of the conflict. The United
Nations initially estimated there may be as
many as one million unexploded cluster submunitions in Lebanon resulting from an exceptionally high overall failure rate of about

40 percent for the cluster submunitions fired
or dropped in Lebanon during the conflict.18
U.N. and Lebanese demining teams have
found 770 cluster-munition strike locations
as of October 10, 2006 and this number will
continue to grow as the search continues.19
Reports made shortly after the end of
the conflict documented initial findings of
unexploded cluster submunitions on the
ground in Lebanon, including M42s, M46s,
three variations of M85s, M77s and BLU63s.4, 18, 20, 21 Notably, all four of the cluster
munitions dispersing these submunitions
are included in Human Rights Watch’s
“dirty dozen” list, meaning the primary
cluster munitions used in Lebanon are reported to be among the most inaccurate
and unreliable.12
The cluster submunitions dispersed in
Lebanon appear to have been delivered most
extensively via artillery projectiles, followed
by Multiple Launch Rocket Systems and
less so by aerial cluster bombs.20 It is likely
that additional cluster submunitions will be
found during ongoing clearance in Lebanon,
but these types, delivered by surface and
air, are discussed in the sidebar on the next
page. The United Nations also noted that
in addition to cluster munitions in Lebanon,
there are an estimated 15,300 items of unexploded ordnance including air-dropped
bombs of 500 to 2,000 pounds (200 to 900
kilograms), ground- and naval-launched artillery rounds, and air-delivered rockets.17
Human Rights Watch released an unconfirmed report October 19, 2006 that
stated Hezbollah fired a type of Chinese
cluster munition into Israel as well during
the conflict (see story on the next page).22
Effect on Civilians in Lebanon
When cluster munitions are dropped,
the bomblets can be spread intentionally
or unintentionally over a large area. The
Multiple Launch Rocket System, for example, is believed to have a margin of error
of up to three-quarters of a mile (1.2 kilometers) from the intended target.23 Because
of the imprecision of these rockets, an army
may “flood” a battlefield with submunitions
in order to increase the chance of striking
the intended target.23
Unexploded cluster submunitions can in
some cases be extremely unstable and unreliable. While some submunitions may be
moved successfully without detonation depending on how they landed and the cause
of failure, others may explode with even
a touch. Older unexploded submunitions
dropped in Lebanon such as BLU-63 bomblets may be more unreliable or unstable
with age24 ; additionally, small submunitions

such as MLRS-delivered M77 bomblets can
be hard to see until it is too late (see story
on the next page for information on both).
In this way, some consider cluster bomblets
with high failure rates to become de facto
anti-personnel landmines.
Colin King, international landmine and
explosive ordnance disposal consultant,
notes that unexploded cluster bomblets are
dangerous in part because their condition is
unknown: They might be fully armed and
ready to detonate, not armed and relatively

of South Lebanon and Lebanon’s National
Demining Office, with additional clearance
coming from United Nations Interim Force
in Lebanon troops.26 More than 45,000 submunitions had been cleared by these operators as of October 10, 2006.19
Legality and Future of
Cluster Munitions
The use of cluster munitions is not currently prohibited under international humanitarian law. However, part of IHL prohibits

A United Nations Chinese battalion involved in demining the town of Hiniyah in Lebanon prepares to detonate
unexploded ordnance. The soldiers locate the unexploded devices, remove and relocate them to a safe area, and then
detonate them.
PHOTO COURTESY OF UN/MARK GARTEN

harmless, or partially armed. If they are
armed, they may or may not be capable of
firing, adding to their unpredictability. One
important challenge according to King is not
only to clear the submunitions in Lebanon
safely, but to further study what condition
they were found in and why they failed to
arm and explode.4
As of October 8, 2006 there have been
20 reported post-conflict fatalities and 120
reported injuries from UXO in Lebanon, in
nearly all cases from cluster submunitions.25,
26
Four of these fatalities and 42 of the injuries were children 18 years old or younger.25
The United Nations has estimated it
may take 12 to 15 months to clear most of
the cluster submunitions and other UXO in
Lebanon.19 Because of the large footprints
of cluster bombs, for each strike location
clearance personnel must verify an area totaling 196,000 square meters (48.5 acres)
to locate and destroy all unexploded submunitions.19 The United Nations reported
that as of September 26, over 350 Lebanese
Army personnel along with some 200 nongovernmental organization and commercial
company personnel were working on clearance under the management of the United
Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre

indiscriminate attacks, “which employ a
method or means of combat which cannot
be directed at a specific military objective.”27
Additionally, IHL prohibits disproportionate
attacks, or any that “may be expected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated.”27
Israel claims its use of cluster bombs in
Lebanon complies with international law.
An Israeli military spokesman told Reuters
news agency, “Everything the Israeli Defence
Forces are using is legitimate.”28 Some disagree, arguing as Ken Roth from Human
Rights Watch does that “the use of cluster
munitions in or near civilian areas violates
the ban on indiscriminate attacks, because
these weapons cannot be directed at only
military targets.”29
The tension over cluster-munition use
is an intersection of humanitarian concerns
and military interests. This is reflected in
debates over the future of cluster munitions. Some nongovernmental organizations—notably the Mennonite Central
Committee—have long been advocating for
a total ban on cluster munitions.24 Other
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NGOs have called for a moratorium on use, production or trade of
cluster munitions until humanitarian concerns can be addressed; this
is the position of the Cluster Munitions Coalition, created in 2003
and now with over 150 member NGOs.30
Rather than prohibiting use, some militaries have instead started taking a technological response to cluster munitions, creating
weapons with lower failure rates, improved accuracy, self-destruct/
self-neutralizing mechanisms or back-up secondary fuzes.10 Rather
than stop using them, the goal is to increase reliability. Not all
militaries support this, with poorer ones, such as Russia and China,
arguing they cannot afford such an approach.24 Yet improvements
to cluster munitions are supported by many within the military who

have experienced the danger of fratricide to ground troops by unexploded submunitions deployed by their own military.
The U.S. Department of Defense’s 2006 proposed military
spending budget requested funding to update outdated cluster munitions.31 Updating cluster munitions would potentially improve
targeting and the dud rate. The Army requested $124.8 million
to purchase 1,026 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System munitions.31 The GMLRS claims to reduce the dud rate of the current
MLRS by 95 percent and the impact area by 85 percent.31 These
new munitions aim to solve many of the problems of the older cluster munitions: indiscriminant effects, high dud rates and attacks
on civilians.

Conclusion
The Mennonite Central Committee has used the phrase “drop today, kill tomorrow” to
describe the danger cluster munition UXO can pose for civilians.32 This is clearly the case
in post-conflict Lebanon, where unexploded cluster submunitions are already killing civilians. However, not all cluster munitions are created equal, and this issue is complex. The
debate continues with some defending the use of cluster munitions, others advocating for
improvements in technology or stronger legal regulation and still others decrying any use at
all. What is undeniable is that cluster submunition duds have resulted in explosive remnants
of war that continue to injure innocent civilians. There may be more than one solution to
the problem of cluster munitions, but it demands an answer and should not be ignored.
For additional information on the use of cluster munitions in the recent Israel/Hezbollah
conflict, see the MAIC fact sheet on page 113.

Cluster Submunitions Reportedly Found in
Lebanon and Israel
As discussed in the adjacent article, early reports soon after the
end of the recent conflict in Lebanon have documented that initial findings of unexploded cluster submunitions on the ground in
Lebanon include M42s, M46s, M85s, M77s and BLU-63s. Human
Rights Watch also released an unconfirmed report that states
Hezbollah fired Chinese cluster munitions with Type-90 submunitions into Israel during the conflict. Most of the unexploded submunitions so far reported are surface-launched Dual Purpose Improved
Conventional Munitions, with one air-delivered submunition also
documented. These submunitions and their cluster weapon dispensers are examined here.
Surface-launched DPICMs Found in Lebanon and Israel
Most of the unexploded submunitions being found in Lebanon
are Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions. DPICMs are
designed for two purposes: anti-armor and anti-personnel attack.
The anti-armor feature results from a “HEAT” (High Explosive AntiTank) shaped charge in the submunition that allows it to penetrate
metal, while the anti-personnel feature occurs via an enhanced fragmentation case on the submunition that explodes to create a powerful
blast with shrapnel.4, 33
The M42, M46, M85 and M77 have a drag ribbon, which, when
fired, unfurls to stabilize the bomblet. The ribbon will vibrate in the
wind, arming the bomblet. If the ribbon does not unfurl, or becomes
entangled, the bomblet will not be armed, and therefore will not explode on impact, resulting in a dud that could explode later. Due to
the compact size of these bomblets (sometimes compared with the
size of a D battery), it is possible for a majority of the duds to become
hidden when they land, resulting in UXO that not only may be hard
to see but may also look like a toy to a child.
M42 and M46 (via M483A1). One type of surface-launched
cluster munition used in Lebanon is the M483A1 155-mm artillery
projectile. The M483A1 is delivered from a Howitzer, a type of cannon artillery that can fire from the ground at high angles. During
flight, the bottom of the artillery projectile is blown off by a pre-set
fuze, with the explosion forcing 88 submunitions out of the container
to fall out over a target area.33
The submunitions in the M483A1 are M42s and M46s. Sixtyfour of the submunitions (the M42s) are scored, or notched, to cause
them to explode into anti-personnel fragments of metal; the HEAT
warheads of all 88 of the submunitions can penetrate seven centimeters (2.75 inches) of armor.34 The M42/46 DPICMs have a tested
failure rate of 2 to 4 percent,33 though additional testing of existing
stocks has produced a dud rate closer to 14 percent.11
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M85 (via M395/396). Two other types of cluster munitions
used in Lebanon are the M395 and M396 155-mm artillery projectiles. These two Israeli-produced munitions contain 63 and 49 M85
submunitions, respectively. The range of the M395 is 23 kilometers
(14.3 miles) and the M396 has an extended range to 30 kilometers
(18.6 miles).35
The M395/396 are similar in ballistic performance to the
M483A1.35 Unlike the U.S. model, however, reported submunition failure rates in testing are much lower at 1.3 to 2.3 percent;
this lower rate is due to the addition of a self-destruct device and a
highly sensitive impact fuze.20, 36 However, by September 13, 2006,
the UNMACC-SL reported that out of a total of 5,045 submunition
duds they had located and destroyed, 691 were M85 submunitions.17
Steve Goose of HRW noted that the number of M85 duds was strikingly high for a submunition with a self-destruct feature that claims
to dramatically reduce the failure rate.20
However, Colin King, international landmine and explosive ordnance disposal consultant, reports that in Lebanon, initial findings
suggest that rather than one type of M85, clearance teams are actually finding three variations of the M85 with completely different designs. Two of these variations have a self-destruct capability, but the
third type also used does not have this feature. While both the selfdestruct and non-self-destruct varieties have been found unexploded,
further research is needed to determine their individual failure rates,
the condition they were left in and why each variety failed to explode

Diagram of a DPICM submunition.  
GRAPHIC COURTESY OF COLIN KING/ORDATA/MAIC

An M85 submunition, one of the types recently
found in Lebanon.

An M77 submunition, one of the types recently
found in Lebanon.
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and/or self-destruct.4 This also implies that it is problematic for reports to refer to “the
M85” without specifying which variety is meant.
M77 (via MLRS-delivered M26). Potentially the most lethal method for delivering cluster munitions from the ground to a target is the Multiple Launch Rocket System
launching M26 warheads. This rocket system can hit a target from a mobile platform 32 to
38 kilometers (20 to 23.5 miles) away.5, 9 The MLRS can fire 12 rockets in 60 seconds. Each
rocket releases 644 M77 dual-purpose anti-armor and anti-personnel bomblets and can
saturate a target 200 meters (650 feet) in diameter with these submunitions.33 Submunition
HEAT warheads can penetrate up to 10 centimeters (four inches) of steel while shrapnel
can travel over seven meters (eight yards) in any direction.37
The average dud rate of the MLRS bomblets is 5 to 23 percent according to U.S. tests;
British military tests put it at 5 to 10 percent.5 That means that at a probable minimum
(with a 5-percent failure rate), 32 bomblets from one rocket will not explode on impact,
and have the potential to explode later. If an MLRS shoots 12 rockets in 60 seconds, at
least 388 unexploded submunitions can be expected to be left on the ground over the
targeted area during that minute.37
Type-90 (via Type-81). According to an unconfirmed Human Rights Watch report,
Hezbollah fired into Israel Chinese-made artillery rockets called Type-81s that were previously unused by an armed force anywhere in the world.22 The Type-81 is a 122-mm
cluster munition rocket that contains 39 submunitions. These submunitions are called
Type-90s (also known as MZDs) and are dual-purpose: as they explode on impact for an
anti-armor effect, they fragment into hundreds of steel spheres about 3.5 mm in diameter
over a wide area.38 A reliable failure rate for this submunition is not known.38
Air-dropped Submunitions in Lebanon
BLU-63 (via CBU-58/B). CBU-58/Bs are aerial aircraft cluster bombs containing
650 BLU-63 bomblets, developed in the early 1960s and supplied by the United States.
These unguided bomblets are ball-like submunitions three inches (7.5 centimeters) in
diameter with a scored steel casing that can produce 260 fragments on impact for an
anti-personnel effect.39, 40 While a reliable dud rate is not known, HRW observers reported in the recent conflict seeing one canister stamped with load date of September 1973
and two catastrophic failures, where “the weapon completely failed to function and none
of the bomblets were dispersed or exploded.”19 Unexploded BLU-63 bomblets were also
found in Lebanon after Israel’s cluster bomb attacks in the conflicts of 1978 and 1982.13

Special thanks to Colin King for his assistance in
providing information for parts of this article.
For additional references for this article, please
visit http://snipurl.com/15i42
See Endnotes, page 110
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